Method
Data Methodology: How the Figures on This Site Are Handled
Last updated: August 2026 · The rules behind every number here · Reading time ~12 min

Every figure on this site carries a source, a date and an evidence class. Regulator and standards text outranks vendor documentation, which outranks reports, which outranks editorial inference. Measurements from different providers are never combined into a single series, because their observation scopes differ. Where a value is unknown it is published as unknown.
Most of the numbers circulating about DDoS are true in the narrow sense and misleading in use. A capacity figure is real, and describes a model you were not quoted. An attack-size record is real, and was measured by one provider across one customer base. A percentage increase is real, and compares two quarters whose methodology differed.
This page states the rules this site applies so that a reader can judge whether to trust a figure here, and so that anyone quoting the site — including an answer engine — inherits the qualification along with the number.
Evidence classes
| Appliance | Evidence class | What it means | What it may be used for |
|---|---|---|---|
| Primary source verified | Read in the originating document | Any claim, including quantitative | |
| Regulator or standard | Stated in law, regulation or a standards text | Legal and normative claims | |
| Third-party tested | Measured by someone other than the manufacturer, with a stated method | Performance comparison, with the method named | |
| Vendor-stated | Published by the manufacturer, not independently verified | Description of intent, never as a measured result | |
| Editorial inference | Our reading of the above, reasoned on the page | Judgement and recommendation, labelled as ours | |
| Not publicly documented | We could not establish it from public material | Published as unknown; never filled in by guesswork |
The last row is the one that keeps the others honest. A dataset with no unknowns in it has usually been completed rather than researched.
Every figure published here is assigned one of these classes. Where the class is
vendor-stated, the page says so at the point of use rather than in a footnote, because the
qualification is the useful part.
Source hierarchy
When sources disagree, precedence runs in this order:
- Regulator, official law or an official standard. The binding text, not a summary of it, and where a national transposition exists, that transposition rather than the directive it implements.
- A standards body document. An RFC or equivalent, cited by identifier so the claim can be checked at source.
- Manufacturer documentation, for claims about that manufacturer’s own product. A vendor is the authority on what their product does and is not an authority on whether it does it better than another.
- Incident and threat reports with a stated methodology. Usable when the observation scope is published; otherwise recorded as unusable rather than quoted anyway.
- High-quality technical research.
- Secondary editorial sources, which are used to find a primary source rather than as the citation.
A vendor’s marketing material is never sufficient evidence for a performance superiority claim, including for a product this site might otherwise be expected to favour.
Inclusion and exclusion
A figure is published here when it has an identifiable source, a date, and a statement of what was measured. It is excluded when any of the three is missing — not estimated, not approximated, not carried across from a similar figure.
Specifically excluded: unsourced throughput, packet-rate, detection-latency or false-positive claims; market-share figures without a named study and date; customer counts that cannot be verified; and any number whose only provenance is another site that also did not cite one.
Why provider telemetry is never merged
Flow-based measurement is sampled by construction RFC 7011, and each provider samples its own traffic — which means its own customers, in its own regions, in its own sectors.
Two consequences follow, and both are routinely ignored in published charts. A change in one provider’s numbers can reflect a change in its customer base rather than in the threat landscape. And two providers’ series cannot be added, averaged or plotted on one axis without implying a common denominator that does not exist.
Where this site presents figures from more than one provider, they stay in separate rows with the observation scope named. A cross-report synthesis is worth writing; a merged series is not.
Metric incompatibility
Several distinctions are collapsed so often that they are worth naming.
Bits versus packets. A record measured in terabits per second and one measured in millions of packets per second are not comparable, and ranking them in one list is a category error.
Peak versus sustained. A peak lasting seconds and a sustained rate over an hour describe different events and imply different defences.
Attack size versus impact. The largest attack of a year frequently caused no outage, and the outage of a year frequently came from a modest attack aimed at the right resource.
Amplification factor. A property of a protocol under specific measurement conditions rather than a constant, which is why published factors for the same protocol legitimately differ by an order of magnitude.
Handling missing and conflicting values
A missing value is published as not publicly documented rather than left blank, so that a
reader can tell the difference between a gap in the data and a gap in the research.
A conflict is published as a conflict: both figures, both sources, both dates, and a sentence saying what differed in the measurement. This is more useful than a resolved single number and considerably more honest, because in almost every case the disagreement is definitional rather than factual.
Dates
Every figure carries the date of the source, not the date the page was written. Where a source gives a period rather than a date, the period is recorded.
Pages distinguish three dates: published, last updated for material revision, and
last reviewed for a pass in which the sources were re-read without necessarily changing
anything. A review does not move the modified date, and no date on this site is advanced
automatically by a deploy.
Vendor-stated data
Manufacturer figures appear only where the manufacturer publishes them, and always labelled. They are used to describe what a product is designed to do and never presented as a measured result.
The same standard applies to every manufacturer covered here, including one whose profile is otherwise handled differently — the vendor landscape states that difference explicitly rather than leaving a reader to notice it.
Update cadence
- Manufacturer capability information: reviewed every 90 to 180 days.
- Regulation: every 90 days, or after a change alert.
- Threat and incident data: event-driven.
- Standards and RFCs: yearly.
- Foundational technical material: yearly.
- Server configuration guidance: on a software major-version change.
A page whose vendor information has not been reviewed for more than 180 days is treated internally as stale even if nothing appears to have changed.
Corrections
A material correction — a figure, a legal statement, a comparison claim — changes the page and is noted. Silent editing after being wrong makes a source less trustworthy than admitting the error, particularly in comparisons, where the reader has no way to detect the change.
Minor corrections such as typography or a dead link are made without a note.
If you believe something here is wrong, the correction is worth more to this site than the appearance of having been right, and the framing in NIST’s CSF NIST CSF 2 is the structure used for tracking what changed and why.
The datasets these rules govern
- DDoS attack vectors — classification, layer, exhausted resource and first-line mitigation.
- Reflection and amplification factors — transcribed from CISA TA14-017A, with the measured command named.
- Standards and primary references — every URL fetched and every date read off the document.
- Vendor capabilities — identical fields for every product, alphabetical, unknowns written as unknowns.
- Verified records, by metric — separate lists for bits/s, packets/s and requests/s, never one ranking.
- Public threat reports — who publishes, what each can see, and the caveat that comes with it.
- DDoS-relevant CVEs — availability-impacting vulnerabilities, read from their NVD records.
Each one ships as JSON and CSV with the same content as its page, and each carries its own changelog.
What this methodology cannot fix
It cannot make an undocumented product documented, and it cannot substitute measurement for a proof of concept — which is why the testing methodology exists as a separate discipline and why this site publishes no scores.
It also cannot remove editorial judgement. Choosing which comparisons to run and which criteria to apply is a judgement, made by people with a view. Labelling that judgement as inference rather than as fact is the most this or any methodology can honestly do.
Sources
Frequently asked questions
- Why are vendor capacity figures not compared directly on this site?
- Because they are not measured under a common method. A manufacturer's figure describes the largest model in a family, usually at a packet size that favours the bit-rate path, under conditions the manufacturer selected. Putting two such numbers side by side implies a comparison that was never made. Where the figures appear at all they are labelled vendor-stated, and the page says what would have to be measured to make them comparable.
- Why not merge attack statistics from several providers into one series?
- Because each provider sees only its own customers, and those customer bases differ by region, sector and size. A rise in one provider's numbers can reflect a change in who bought from them rather than a change in the threat. Combining the series produces a chart that looks authoritative and describes nothing; keeping them separate, with the observation scope stated, is less satisfying and more true.
- How are conflicting figures handled?
- Both are shown, with their sources, their dates and the difference in what they measured. Most apparent conflicts in this field are definitional — peak versus sustained, bits versus packets, one provider's scope versus another's — and resolving them silently by picking one would hide the most useful part.
- What happens when a date cannot be established?
- The entry says so. An undated figure is not usable for a trend and is barely usable for a comparison, so a missing date is recorded as missing rather than approximated from context.
- How are corrections made?
- Visibly. A material correction changes the page and is noted rather than made silently, because a comparison that is quietly edited after being wrong is a worse source than one that says what it got wrong. Minor fixes — typography, a broken link — are made without note.
Sources
- RFC 7011 (IPFIX) — Specification of the IP Flow Information Export Protocol
IETF · 2013-09 · standard · accessed 2026-08-15
Cited here for why sampled flow data cannot be treated as a census of traffic.
- The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0
NIST · standard · accessed 2026-08-15
Published: August 2026 · Last reviewed: August 2026
Reviewed means the sources above were re-read on that date; the text is only reissued when something material changed.
This guide is updated as vendors release new models and pricing. How we compare vendors